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A key component of the insurance industry operating successfully is the company’s
ability to accurately predict the risks that they are taking on when they agree to insure against
possible losses to their clients. Hurricanes, tornados, and other natural events can be tricky to
predict, but often can cause substantial damage, which in turn will lead to a large number of
insureds filing a claim with their insurance company. In 2017, $306 billion of damages was
caused by storms and other natural disasters, which was the most expensive year for natural
disaster related damage in United States history (Mooney & Dennis, 2018). This shows that it is
very important for insurers and reinsurers to have as great of an understanding on their potential
exposures as possible, in order to maintain profitability as a business. This is where catastrophe
models are being used to try to more accurately make predictions on the frequency, severity, and
location of possible storms.
AIR Worldwide began developing catastrophe models in 1987 and have since established
themselves as one of the premiere providers in the catastrophe modelling industry (“About
Catastrophe Risk Modeling”, 2018). Their models use computer simulations to try to estimate all
plausible catastrophic events. These models are now very advanced and include a tremendous
amount of data. The models essentially look to make predictions for a wide variety of factors that
collectively contribute to the damage amounts and any insured loss that the insurance or
reinsurance company would be liable to payout in claims. To make these predictions, historical
information is used as a basis for the simulation that the model will run. It is important to note
that catastrophe models aren’t designed to make predictions of specific future events, but rather
to estimate the probability of future loss (Wang, 2012). These simulations are over many years
and help to create probabilities for all sorts of natural disasters occurring in a given area at a
given severity. This is much better than relying solely on the historical information because as
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you go further into the past, the quality and quantity of available data can be diminished. Also,
there are changes occurring in many other aspects related to storm damage, such as development
of cities, population shifts, and changing climate conditions. One way that AIR tries to account
for this uncertainty is to include climate data along with the historical occurrence of storms to
create probability distribution functions of the storms. These are then used to create a portfolio of
all physically plausible events (“Casualty Actuarial Society”, 2010).
Frequency and severity of catastrophes are two pieces of these models, which estimate
how many and how strong a potential event is likely to be. This information, combined with
detailed information about the property and structures in the theoretical area and the policy
terms, allows the catastrophe model to predict insured loss. This exposure information is
extremely important to the accuracy of the model. The model is only as good as the data allows it
to be, so ideally, it will have very detailed, possibly address specific, information about building
values and structural integrity. Without this information, the utility of the model will be limited.
If the information about building values is limited to citywide or zip codes, then the model will
be unable to make as accurate of predictions as it otherwise would’ve. This can be combined
with detailed insurance policy information, which will allow the model to create loss
probabilities for insurers.
Today, AIR models include a variety of statistics that assist companies in properly
assessing their risk. These include: average annual loss, exceedance probability, probable
maximum loss, and tail value at risk. Average annual loss is simply the amount of predicted loss
per year by the model, which can be calculated from the exceedance probability (“About
Catastrophe Risk Modeling”, 2018). Insurance companies can use the average annual loss to
price their premiums at a level that should help them reach a desired level of profit. This is just
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an average annual loss, predicted over the course of multiple years, and obviously won’t always
be a good estimator for the loss in any given individual year, however, in the long run it should
be fairly accurate. The exceedance probability is the probability that a catastrophe will occur in
the coming year that produces a loss that is greater than or equal to a given value and is the most
often used metric from catastrophe models. This is where the term “1 in 200 year storm” comes
from that is often used to describe major hurricanes. For example, the aforementioned 1 in 200
year storm would have an exceedance probability of 0.5%. This doesn’t mean, however; that
there will be an event in the 200 year period that produces damages to that level. There may be
multiple events or there could be none. It simply is saying that the annual probability that an
event produces damages in excess of that value is 0.5%.
Below is an example of exceedance probability calculations and a graphical
representation using made up figures just to display how the calculations are developed. To
calculate the exceedance probability for a Category 1 hurricane, you would first need to get (1annual probability of occurrence for each of the 5 categories). This gives you the probability of
there being zero hurricanes in each given category in the coming year, which is what we are
looking for to calculate the lowest exceedance probability in the chart, since if any of the events
occurred the expected loss would be at or over the given exceedance probability. You then take
the probability of there not being a hurricane in each of the five categories and multiply those
figures together to get the probability of there being zero hurricanes overall in a given year. That
number is then subtracted from 1 to give you the probability of an individual event occurring
with damages in excess of $1 million in this example. As you move up to the exceedance
probabilities of the other categories, you simply remove the probability of the prior categories
event occurring, for example, a Category 1 hurricane could occur and not be above the $2
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million level, so the probability of a category 1 storm isn’t used in the calculation of the
exceedance probability.
Event
(Ei)
1
2
3
4

Exceedance probability

5

Description
Category 5
Hurricane
Category 4
Hurricane
Category 3
Hurricane
Category 2
Hurricane
Category 1
Hurricane

Annual probability
of occurrence
(pi)

Loss
(Li)

Exceedance
probability

E[L]

0.002

$10,000,000

0.0020

$20,000

0.005

$5,000,000

0.0070

$25,000

0.010

$3,000,000

0.0169

$30,000

0.020

$2,000,000

0.0366

$40,000

0.030

$1,000,000

0.0655

$30,000

0.08
0.06
0.04
0.02
0.00
$0

$5

$10

$15
Millions

Dollar Loss, L (in $ millions)

Possible maximum loss looks at the “worst case scenario” and represents the maximum
loss that the company could theoretically take on that specific exposure. It is very unlikely that
the company will experience a total loss on an exposure as many structures have measures in
place to protect against and mitigate any damage. Therefore, many commercial insurers will
choose to view probable maximum loss instead as the highest maximum claim as a more useful
figure than possible maximum loss (Boggs, 2008).
The tail value at risk measure is an estimate of the expected value of loss given that you
are already passed some exceedance probability. This is often used to estimate large losses,
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which are becoming increasingly frequent, with 16 events that caused over $1 billion in damage
in 2017 alone (Mooney & Dennis, 2018). I think that tail value at risk data could be especially
useful for reinsurers, as they would be interested in the possibility of very large damage amounts
coming from catastrophic events. Even large insurance companies frequently use reinsurance
companies to hedge some of their risk on large exposures, so these large damage events are the
ones that would be the most relevant to reinsurance companies.
The data that I used for this project was gathered from the National Oceanic Atmospheric
Administration. They had detailed storm data from the 1950 through 2017. I chose to focus on
the data from 2008-2017 in my analysis of overall storm damage in the United States. This
dataset was an aggregation of damage reports for property and crop damage resulting from a
wide range of weather events including: minor thunderstorms, droughts, floods, and hurricanes.
The data was broken down into these damage amounts by county, so I was able to sum the
figures in order to get a per storm total. From my analysis I was able to see that the vast majority
of storms produced little to no damage. However, the tails of the distribution were often quite
extreme, with storms causing billions of dollars of property damage. I think that this is really
what insurers worry about, obviously all losses are important and need to be considered, but
many just don’t carry the same weight as some more costly events such as, Hurricane Katrina,
which caused an estimated total of $160 billion in damages (“New list of the Costliest”, 2018).
As evidence for this assertion, according to an AIR Worldwide study, there were 3 cases of
insurance company insolvencies after Katrina hit New Orleans. For comparison, Hurricane
Andrew, another storm that caused well over $100 billion in 1992, resulted in 11 insolvencies
(Wang, 2012). I think that one factor that helped to reduce the number of insolvencies among
insurance companies after another extreme hurricane is the emergence of catastrophe models.
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These models are constantly improving, as the exposure data gets better and industry experts are
continually looking for ways to better quantify the total risk that a company could be exposed to.
It also seems that the industry does a good job of learning from their mistakes, so to say. For
example, following Hurricane Katrina, hurricane models started to be conditioned on warm sea
temperatures, to more accurately reflect rising ocean temperatures over time. Another example of
this is terrorism models were never considered until after 9/11, but are now something that
absolutely needs to be accounted for as insurers (Wang, 2012).
Here, I will discuss some of my findings from analyzing the NOAA dataset. One
noteworthy item was that the vast majority of reported weather events had very little to no
damage to property or crops associated with them. When looking at the 2017 event data, I found
that over 78% of the 8093 reported weather events resulted in $0 of property damage. This is not
surprising, because the data set seemed to represent a fairly exhaustive list of all weather events
that occurred each year, so many of the data points were from a general thunderstorm and
therefore not anything that you would expect to cause much damage. The histograms here help to
visualize these results, as both are heavily skewed to the right.

Due to the large percentage of the data being on the left side, I had to limit the minimum
and maximum values in the graphs to be able to produce output that would show anything
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meaningful. The histogram on the left shows the distribution of storms that produced some
property damage, but was less than $10,000, while the graph on the right displays the storms in
the $1 million to $100 million damage range. Even on such a small range, the histogram on the
right has almost all of the observations in the first bin of the histogram. Less than 0.7% of the
records for 2017 had property damage amounts that were at least $1 million dollars. To further
show how heavily skewed the damage amounts are, I looked at the percentage of storms
producing damage of at least $100,000 and found that to be only around 2.7%. I noticed similar
trends when looking at other recent years, where I found that the percentage of storms that
produced at least $100,000 of damage was 2.1% in 2016, 3.1% in 2014, and 2.6% in 2012. I
didn’t want to go back too far in the data to make comparisons because, as I discussed earlier,
that data is likely not as complete and if it is from too long ago, the damage amounts may not be
based off of similar conditions to the data from the 2010’s. As an example, for 1950, there are
only records of 223 individual events, while most recent years averaged around 10,000 events.
Also, looking at 1950, the largest recorded storm produced just $2.5 million of property damage,
whereas there were 29 events in 2017 with a damage amount of at least $2.5 million. There are a
myriad of potential reasons that I could think of for why this disparity is so great. I think some of
it is just the data available wasn’t as great for 1950, but also changes in climate, development,
and to a lesser extent, inflation, account for the larger damage amounts in more recent years.
The crop data has the same skewness that the property damage data exhibited, but it is
worse in this case. This also seems intuitive, as many events will either be one that isn’t severe
enough to cause any measurable crop damage, or it simply occurs in an area where crop damage
isn’t much of a possibility. However, when crop damage was reported, it was often substantial.
Looking at the 2017 data, the expected value of crop damage from a storm, given that damage
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was reported, was just over $2.1 million. It appears that many of these large losses were caused
by droughts, floods, and unseasonably cold weather that resulted in crops freezing.

An interesting observation is that the graphs of crop damage look very similar when cut
at different points. The first histogram is $100,000 to $100,000,000, while the second shows all
storms with non-zero damage. Obviously the units are different as the second histogram includes
many observations that were under $100,000, but the distributions appear to be very similar.
I included a plot tracking the reported property damage dollar amounts to structures over
the last 10 years. Due to the fairly small sample size, it is hard to say anything definitive, but
there appears to be a general upward trend to the data. 2017 was obviously a terrible year for
storms, so it will be interesting to see if that represents the continuation of an upward trend for
storm damage or if it is just a one year anomaly.
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I think there is solid evidence that the damage caused by storms will generally increase
for the foreseeable future. Between rising ocean temperatures and a continued influx of people
and development moving into coastal areas, it seems that the potential for devastating storms will
only rise. Therefore, it will be increasingly more important that insurers are able to accurately
model these storms moving forward. Catastrophe models are already very useful for pricing and
ratemaking in the insurance industry and, as more data is added to them, they will only get better
as time goes on. This should in turn allow insurers a better understanding of their exposures,
providing a better experience for both them and the insureds.
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